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A B S T R A C T   
The German energy transition has been hailed as a role model for climate action. However, plans for the con-
struction of three large-scale Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals are receiving strong state support. 
This is inconsistent with Germany’s climate targets, which require a reduction rather than expansion of natural 
gas consumption. In our paper, we aim to unpack the connection between the risk of natural gas lock-in and the 
energy transition. We analyse the co-evolution of the techno-economic, socio-technical and political realms of the 
German natural gas sector and influence of actors within that process. We use a combination of energy system 
and interview data, and introduce a new approach to triangulate material and actor analysis. We show that four 
natural gas lock-in mechanisms cause the support for LNG in Germany: (A) the geopolitical influence from the 
United States, combined with (B) security of supply concerns due to the planned coal and nuclear phase-out, (C) 
pressure from a wide variety of state and private sector actors, and (D) sunk investments in existing gas infra-
structure. Two additional mechanisms supporting the strong position of natural gas are (E) the strength of the 
emerging synthetic gas niche, and (F) weak opposition against LNG and natural gas. We highlight the severely 
overlooked lock-in potential and related emissions, which could complicate and decelerate energy transitions as 
more countries reach a more advanced phase of the energy transition.   
1. Introduction 
Natural gas use is the most rapidly growing among all fossil fuels, 
and was responsible for about 35% of growth in global CO2 emissions 
since 2009 [1]. While some present natural gas as a ‘bridge technology’ 
[2,3],2 others argue that this is an ambiguous narrative to influence 
expectations and visions regarding natural gas [6]. In fact, using natural 
gas as a substitute for coal can lead to negative climate consequences 
due to so far underestimated life cycle emissions [7-10] and a delay of a 
climate neutral energy system [11]. Here, we highlight a third risk of 
natural gas as a bridge fuel: locking-in large-scale carbon-intensive 
infrastructure, which could undermine long-term climate goals. 
The current rise in natural gas use is also reflected in the dawn of new 
infrastructure for trading Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG): Global LNG 
export infrastructure grew to 442 million tons per annum (MTPA) in 
May 2020, and LNG import infrastructure currently stands at 844 MTPA 
[12].3 This compares to an LNG trade of 355 MT in 2019 [13], an in-
crease of ~45% compared to 2015 [14].4 The existing oversupply on the 
global market – especially due to new supplies from Australia, the 
United States and Russia – has led suppliers to search for new export 
possibilities, and Europe is becoming an attractive import market for 
LNG, as today’s low LNG prices converge to the continent’s pipeline 
* Corresponding author at: Europa-Universität Flensburg, Economics of Sustainable Energy System Transition, Munketoft 3, 24937 Flensburg, Germany. 
E-mail address: hbr@wip.tu-berlin.de (H. Brauers).   
1 The first two authors contributed equally to this paper.  
2 They mostly base this assumption on the fact that natural gas can emit up to 60% less CO2 emissions compared to coal, when one accounts only for the burning 
process [4]. However, when accounting for life cycle emissions the outcome is less positive [5].  
3 Another 122 MTPA of export capacities and 144 MTPA of import capacities are currently under construction [12].  
4 Shipping natural gas as LNG additionally increases the greenhouse gas footprint, due to cooling and pressurising. 
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prices. 
We thus examine the growing tension between the expansion of LNG 
infrastructure and climate protection goals. We use Germany as an ideal 
case to examine this tension because the country is widely recognised as 
a climate leader with impressive progress in its energy transition and 
ambitious decarbonisation plans while at the same time offering strong 
state support to three new LNG terminals (Table 1). We also believe that 
Germany is a particularly instructive case for a challenge, which other 
states may face as they enter the ‘next phase’ of the energy transition – 
when renewables reach a larger share of the electricity sector and the 
decline of existing technologies begins [15]. Like many other states, 
Germany has pledged to phase-out coal5, and additionally nuclear en-
ergy, but the pathway of the remaining energy transition to reach its 
emission reductions target is still unclear. 
In our paper, we answer the following research questions: How do 
the material conditions around natural gas consumption and LNG 
infrastructure relate to and interact with actors’ perceptions of these 
conditions? And how do these interactions shape systemic changes and 
create lock-ins for the German energy transition? 
We do this by analysing the co-evolution of key energy technologies 
and markets, the related socio-technical system and the political system, 
and analyse how actors’ perceptions shape and are shaped by each of 
these realms. Our methodological innovation is the further development 
of a meta-theoretical framework on energy transitions [16] (see Section 
4). More specifically, we use the meta-theoretical framework [16] as a 
map to identify relevant questions and actors to probe through a series of 
interviews and workshops. 
As a result, we are able to identify the role of structural developments 
regarding the energy market as well as the role of actors and their in-
terests and perceptions in the respective decision-making process. We 
show that (A) support for the planned LNG terminals in Germany arises 
from geopolitical influence from the US, combined with (B) concerns 
over security of supply mainly due to the coal phase-out and reliance on 
Russian natural gas imports, (C) pressure from a wide variety of actors 
benefiting from high levels of natural gas consumption, (D) sunk in-
vestments in existing gas infrastructure, (E) the support of the arising 
synthetic gas niche, as well as (F) a weak opposition against LNG and 
natural gas in general. These findings are particularly relevant for other 
EU countries phasing-out coal, which may face similar concerns and 
pressure and may also consider natural gas as a bridge fuel within the 
energy transition. 
2. Case description 
Fig. 1 depicts all existing and planned LNG terminals in the EU. As of 
January 2021, there were three potential locations for large-scale LNG 
terminals in Germany.6 All locations are in the North of the country: 
Brunsbüttel in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, and Wilhelmshaven and 
Stade in Lower Saxony. Together the three terminals would account for 
~ 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas (Table 1). Jointly, they 
represent the case of LNG in Germany, which we analyse in this paper. 
None of the projects have a final investment decision or construction 
permit. Proposals for the terminal in Wilhelmshaven have been made 
and withdrawn repeatedly since the 1970s. The approval for a land- 
based terminal was granted in 2007. However, the plan changed to 
build a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU), for which no 
approval exists (as of February 2021). The consortium to build the 
Brunsbüttel terminal – German LNG Terminal – was founded in 2018, 
and the terminal in Stade was announced the same year. All of the ter-
minals are supposed to be connected to the existing natural gas grid, 
which requires the construction of connecting pipelines, resulting in 
further major investment costs (see Table 1 and Section 6). 
Schleswig-Holstein’s and Lower Saxony’s licencing authorities 
decide on the permits for the respective terminals. Those scoping, 
regional planning as well as zoning procedures7 – including e.g. the 
environmental impact assessment – typically take several years from the 
initial proposal to the approval, procedural handling, construction, and 
commissioning. The responsible agencies differ depending on the fed-
eral states and are subordinate to different federal state ministries.8 In 
the official approval processes, anyone can submit a position statement, 
voicing support or criticism. The respective offices of the state govern-
ments are also subject to lobbying efforts, making the political level as 
important as the planning and economic level. 
Approval needs to be granted both for the terminals themselves and 
the respective connecting pipelines. Generally, the agencies responsible 
for the approval processes are only dependent on the existing law. 
However, included information in the processes depend also on the 
position of the federal state governments and the respective ministries, 
where especially Lower Saxony is very supportive of LNG, founding its 
own LNG agency.9 
Responsible for the financing of the terminals are the respective 
private companies. However, the respective state governments of Lower 
Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein actively support the projects by 
including them in their coalition agreements10 and by providing fund-
ing, in addition to support by the national government. The Joint Task 
for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures (GRW) promised 
funds for the Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven sites. The state of 
Schleswig-Holstein had already earmarked €50 million for the Bruns-
büttel LNG terminal in its 2020 budget. As these are GRW funds11, the 
federal government would match the €50 million budget, as part of 
complementary financing, in the event of a final allocation. In addition, 
funding opportunities for alternative fuel infrastructure exist as part of 
the national mobility and fuel strategy, and according to the national 
government, construction cost subsidies for the development of an LNG 
port infrastructure are to be provided as well. Lastly, a letter from 
finance minister Scholz in August 2020 promised €1 billion in German 
subsidies for the Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel terminals, if the US 
would “allow for the unhindered construction and operation of Nord 
Stream 2”.12 
Nevertheless, the investment decisions of the LNG project companies 
have been delayed for some time. In November 2020, Uniper announced 
that it would review its plans to build an LNG terminal in Wilhelm-
shaven, after not receiving enough binding capacity bookings from 
5 Clean Energy Wire, Spelling out the coal exit – Germany’s phase-out plan 
(2020). https://t1p.de/lq0v.  
6 One additional small-scale terminal has been proposed in Rostock (also in a 
Northern state of Germany - Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania). As the Rostock 
terminal is much smaller in scale than the other three terminals, and it would 
not become connected to the gas grid in case of construction, we exclude it from 
the further analysis. 
7 In German "Raumordnungsverfahren“ and "Planfeststellungsverfahren“.  
8 See e.g. Schleswig Holstein Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, Arbeit, 
Technologie und Tourismus, German LNG-Terminal in Brunsbüttel. Unterrich-
tung gemäß § 15 UVPG über den Untersuchungsrahmen (2019) https://t1p. 
de/xmdg; Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, Arbeit, Technologie und Tour-
ismus Amt für Planfeststellung Verkehr, German LNG-Terminal Brunsbüttel – 
Beginn Planfeststellungsverfahren (2020). https://t1p.de/o3ks; Landesbüro 
Naturschutz Niedersachsen GbR, Beteiligung in Umweltfragen (2021). 
https://umwelt-beteiligung-niedersachsen.de/faq-page#n16; LabüN Gbr 
(2019). https://t1p.de/h1gk.  
9 LNG Agentur Niedersachsen, LNG-Entwicklung an der niedersächsischen 
Nordsee (2020) https://t1p.de/jszx.  
10 Coalition agreements from 2017 in Lower-Saxony https://t1p.de/9xex and 
Schleswig-Holstein https://t1p.de/4202.  
11 For an explanation of this concept of Regional Development Policy in 
Germany see OECD, Regional Development Policy in Germany (2019). 
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/_Germany.pdf.  
12 Federal Ministry of Finance, Non Paper Germany Nord Stream 2/U.S. LNG 
(2020). https://t1p.de/s7cq. 
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market participants in the pre-tender process. German LNG Terminal, 
the investor for the terminal in Brunsbüttel, already had to ask for an 
extension until June 2022 for the final investment decision. The project 
in Stade plans to take the investment decision in 2021 and to commis-
sion the LNG terminal by 2026. 
The LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven is meant to create around 
~50–60 long-term jobs.13 The terminal in Brunsbüttel is expected to 
create ~70 long-term employees directly by the terminal, and ~1000 
for the construction time of around three years.14 More generally, in 
Brunsbüttel the operators of the terminals suggest that the local con-
stituencies can expect a durable increase in employment, regional value 
added and taxes.15 
3. Theoretical approach 
Here, we consider LNG terminals as part of the energy transition in 
Germany. Energy transitions are long-term structural changes of energy 
systems [33], which evolve along specific pathways [34]. As such, they 
exhibit path-dependence, or inertia to large-scale change. The 
entrenchment of existing systems, which underpin the fossil-fuel inten-
sive energy system, is commonly referred to as ‘carbon lock-in’ [35]. 
Unpacking the connection between lock-in and the energy transition is 
key to understanding what has been called the ‘next phase of the energy 
transition’ [15]: This next phase begins when the growth of new tech-
nologies accelerates to an extent that challenges established technolo-
gies, business models, practices and actors. Here, the key question is no 
longer concerned with understanding the emergence of new technolo-
gies but understanding the inertia of a system – a lock-in. 
In order to disentangle this connection, we follow a meta-theoretical 
framework [16,36], which conceptualises energy transitions as 
unfolding in three autonomous but co-evolving systems: a) policy sys-
tem (composed of political actions and policies), b) techno-economic 
system (composed of energy flows and markets), and c) socio- 
technical system (composed of energy technologies and artefacts, busi-
nesses and practices).16 The development and interaction of each of the 
three systems – or realms as we refer to them as of now in this paper – 
can explain the course of energy transitions. With reference to Elinor 
Ostrom’s research [43], all three realms are described as semi- 
autonomous with e.g. their own elements, boundaries and dynamics. 
While all three realms can develop independently of each other, they 
also interact, and hence co-evolve. The framework makes it possible to 
identify mechanisms affecting one or several of the three realms, 
explaining course of change – or lock-in. These dynamics are shaped by 
both material realities and actor perceptions [16],17 with lock-in playing a 
distinct role in each of these realms. 
We consider all three co-evolving realms and their developments as 
well as the international context to explain the political support for the 
construction of LNG terminals in Germany and explore whether this 
fosters lock-in during the next phase of the energy transition (see 
Table 2): 
a) Political realm: The political realm covers how policies shape the 
Table 1 
Short profile of planned large-scale import LNG terminals in Germany.  
Sources: [17–32]. 
Note: An FSRU is a Floating Storage Regasification Unit. 
13 GRÜNE Wilhelmshaven, Positionspapier zum LNG-Terminal in Wilhelm-
shaven (2021). https://t1p.de/rz45.  
14 CPL Competence in Ports and Logistics GmbH, Regionalökonomische 
Effekte eines LNG-Terminals (2019). https://t1p.de/kd17. For Stade, no explicit 
numbers of expected jobs were available to us.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Various other frameworks have been developed within the transition 
research community to explain energy transitions and to identify relevant 
variables, most prominently [37,38]: transition management [39], strategic 
niche management [40], the multi-level perspective [41], and technological 
innovation systems [42]. Rooted in evolutionary economics and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), all these frameworks share the concepts of a socio- 
technical system, a socio-technical regime as well as a niche and thus primar-
ily can explain the development of the socio-technical system. In contrast, the 
approach we use here [16] can account for important political economy aspects 
shaping energy transitions, such as how techno-economic developments shape 
and constrain choices, and how the policy system co-evolves with the socio- 
technical system. 
17 By material realities we mean the concrete challenges and constraints en-
ergy policies face, such as meeting rising energy demand with secure supply 
[44], technology availability as well as existing regulations, whereas by per-
ceptions we mean how these realities are seen. 
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energy system and how special interests shape policies [36]. Thus, the 
focus is on policy systems – encompassing political actions and energy 
policies. Most relevant to the next phase of the energy transition is how 
the state, as an actor, navigates the supply–demand balance [44], 
particularly in the face of growing variable renewable sources. Also of 
interest is how different interests are mediated by political processes and 
institutions [45,46]. We understand institutions as formal and informal 
structures, which shape society (e.g. policies, standards, rules, values) 
[38]. 
Thus, the political realm is characterised by what Seto et al. [35] 
refer to as institutional lock-in, whereby various interests and actors 
benefit from the status quo. Institutional lock-in exists as institutions 
strongly discourage and impede change once they are established, and 
institutions get defended by (a powerful network of) beneficiaries [47]. 
To what extent policy-makers are able to break the lock-in may be to a 
large extent mediated by the state’s overall capacity to balance diffuse 
with concentrated interests [48,49]. The agency of actors can determine 
the direction and extent of institutional change [50]. Additionally, we 
include discursive lock-in in our analysis of the political realm: “A 
discourse assigns meaning, defines power relations and creates subjects 
and objects through practices. A discourse is always in competition with 
other discourses and is struggling for its reproduction (by practices) and 
for dominance in a field” [51]. Therefore, dominant discourses in the 
political realm can constitute and justify technologies, institutions and 
behaviours [51], and deserve particular attention in understanding en-
ergy transitions (see also [52,53]). Here, the discursive debate with 
Fig. 1. Existing and planned LNG terminals in Germany and the EU. Source: Authors’ illustration based on d-maps and the Global Energy Monitor. (d-maps, Map 
Europe (2021), https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2233&lang=en and Global Energy Monitor, Europe Gas Tracker (2021), https://globalenergymonitor. 
org/projects/europe-gas-tracker/tracker-map/.) 
Table 2 
Systemic focus, key concepts and role of lock-in in each realm.  
Realm Systemic focus (based on [16]) Key concepts for the next phase of the 
energy transition 
The role of lock-in in this realm (developed from [35]) 
Political realm Policy systems – political actions and 
energy policies 
State balancing supply and demand and 
competing interests 
Institutional lock-in, particularly vested interests, and discursive lock- 




Energy flows and markets Managing stable energy provision and 
transition of a larger portion of the energy 
system to low-carbon 




Energy technologies and artefacts, 
businesses and practices embedded in 
socio-technical systems 
Understanding regime resilience 
particularly amidst increased pressure from 
new(ish) entrants 
Behavioural lock-in, or the continuation of suboptimal technology 
use, regime resistance in the form of combined instrumental, 
discursive, material and institutional forms of power  
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regards to gas [54] is mainly about whether it perpetuates carbon lock- 
in or creates a bridge to low-carbon sources. 
b) Techno-economic realm: The techno-economic realm covers 
energy flows and markets [16]. Most relevant to the next phase of the 
energy transition is how to manage base load demand and how to 
transition a larger portion of the energy system to low-carbon, mostly 
variable electricity sources. Here, the focus is on the infrastructure itself 
and quantifying the value investors lose under different climate policies 
[55]. Stranded assets – either unpaid capital costs or lost profits due to 
climate policies – is thus a concept closely related to lock-in, known in 
the framework of Seto et al. [35] as infrastructural and technological lock- 
in. The theory is that the investment in a given infrastructure leads to 
increased inertia and lock-in to preserve the profits from that infra-
structure [56–58]. The infrastructure lock-in consists of a lock-in 
directly by existing infrastructure emitting GHGs (e.g. power plants), 
supporting infrastructure (such as pipelines or LNG terminals), and built 
infrastructures of human societies (e.g. gas heating in homes) 
[51,59–61]. 
c) Socio-technical realm: The socio-technical realm covers the 
emergence and diffusion of new technologies as well as their struggle 
with existing ones. In the socio-technical realm, the systemic focus is on 
energy technologies, artefacts, businesses and practices embedded in 
socio-technical systems. Most relevant to the next phase of the energy 
transition using socio-technical transition analysis [62–64] is to under-
stand regime resilience [41,65], particularly amidst growing pressure 
from new(ish) entrants. This connects to what Seto et al. [35] call 
behavioural lock-in, which is the continuation of current practices 
through individual decisions and choices, influenced also by social 
norms and cultural values. However, behavioural lock-in is a much less 
mature scientific concept than institutional lock-in or infrastructure 
lock-in [66]. Behavioural lock-in could be gauged by the technology- 
specific strength and pervasiveness of consumer habits [67]. 
One form of a lock-in in the socio-technical realm has previously 
been termed regime resistance [68]. Regime resistance combines instru-
mental, discursive, material and institutional forms of power. Instru-
mental forms of power thereby refer to strategies of actors using their 
resources and cooperation with others to fulfil their interests. Discursive 
strategies aim to shape which and how issues are publicly and politically 
discussed. Material strategies target the technical dimension and focus 
especially on technical capabilities and financial resources, e.g. to 
attract further funding or to prevent regulation. The broader institu-
tional power of actors is embedded in political cultures, ideology and 
governance structures, and this context can support regime resistance 
[68]. The deployment of such structural power depends on how interests 
and ideas are promoted and used and how they rely on institutional 
opportunities [69]. 
One key theoretical question is how these relatively autonomous 
realms interact. Policies, artefacts and actors all connect and influence 
the three realms (grey boxes in Fig. 2). A policy, such as a feed-in-tariff, 
is born out of a given political climate in the political realm, changes the 
profitability of different generation sources in the energy realm, and 
empowers a niche in the socio-technical realm. An artefact, such as a 
new technology can make certain pathways possible in the techno- 
economic realm but may also destabilise a regime in the socio- 
technical realm. Here, we focus on how key actors walk across realms, 
play different roles in different realms and thus facilitate their co- 
evolution. This has important implications because it is actors who 
have agency and can shape the unfolding energy transition and have the 
capacity to slow it down or speed it up [70]. 
Actors have different abilities to “mobilize resources to achieve a 
certain goal” [71]. Resources can be e.g. human capacity, and mental or 
capital assets. To achieve their goals, actors need – besides access to 
resources – strategies to mobilise and skills to apply them, as well as the 
willingness to do so [71]. The more resources an actor has, and the 
better the strategies he/she uses to mobilise the resources, the more 
powerful an actor is. For our analysis, it is particularly interesting which 
strategies actors use to assert their interests and how this leads to po-
tential carbon lock-ins. Strategies include e.g. actors forming alliances 
and networks [72,73], conventional lobbying [73], or influencing ex-
pectations through discourses [50,69,72]. At the same time, actors are 
constrained by the realms within which they operate [50,72,74–76]. 
Our analysis introduces a new approach to marrying material and 
perception analysis. While an analysis of material realities describes the 
context within which actors operate, it does not address how their 
agency depends on their perceptions of a specific situation (e.g. the 
systems’ status quo or likely future developments). Thus, our approach 
provides the foundation for identifying the space for agency in shaping 
the energy transition by providing a roadmap for identifying the 
connection between material realities and actors’ interests and strate-
gies. Thereby, we gain a deeper understanding of the underlying lock-in 
mechanisms influencing the course of energy transitions. 
4. Methodological approach 
In order to unpack the connections between the LNG terminals and a 
potential risk of a gas lock-in in the next phase of Germany’s energy 
transition, we developed a methodological approach based on the 
theoretical foundation of Section 3. We thus identify the relevant de-
velopments in the three co-evolving realms through material analysis 
focused on the techno-economic, political, and socio-technical de-
velopments within each realm, complemented with an actor analysis 
focused on their interests, perceptions and interactions. 
4.1. Material analysis 
Our material analysis is based on the aforementioned meta- 
theoretical framework [16]. In the following, we introduce the rele-
vant variables of each realm (what is referred to as system in the original 
framework [16]), we explain which variables were excluded due to a 
lack of relevance for our empirical case and how we covered the 
remaining ones in our analysis (also summarised in Table 3). 
The political realm covers actors and power. The main variables 
explaining the realm are state goals, state capacities, political interests and 
institutions [16]. We have a special focus on state goals (energy security 
and climate change) and political interests of state, private and civil so-
ciety actors. We neglect state capacity as a constraining variable in the 
German context, as Germany has a high state capacity with strong in-
stitutions and a high level of political stability. We also refrain from 
conducting an in-depth analysis of institutions ourselves, however, a 
coordinated market economy like Germany with federal states, politi-
cally stable and relatively wealthy, implies close interactions between 
the government and a strongly engaged civil society as well as powerful 
incumbents [62,77,78]. In policy issues regarding gas, the close state- 
industry interaction consists of a wide network between different pri-
vate and public sector actors, e.g. lobby and industry associations, and 
the affected larger companies, such as the utilities and network opera-
tors. Official consultation processes, conferences and lobbying behind 
closed doors enable exchange. 
Existing technologies and the related infrastructure as well as energy 
markets form the techno-economic realm. The main variables in this 
realm are supply, demand and infrastructure. We therefore analyse factors 
that influence the development of natural gas demand and supply in 
Germany, the existing natural gas infrastructure in Germany and the EU, 
and the resulting supply–demand balance. We base our analysis on 
collected primary data on existing natural gas infrastructure as well as 
expansion plans, gas consumption and relations with exporters. Addi-
tionally, we include scenarios as estimates for future supply and demand 
balance developments, so that interactions with other energy carriers, 
such as coal, nuclear energy and renewables are included as well. 
The socio-technical realm comprises technological developments 
and social practices, summarised by the main variables regime and niche, 
technology diffusion, and innovation systems. The technology diffusion of 
H. Brauers et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Energy Research & Social Science 76 (2021) 102059
6
LNG in Germany is characteristic of regime development but has inter-
esting interlinkages with the synthetic gas niche, and their respective 
rules, practices, and meanings. LNG has been used for decades in other 
(EU) countries [79] and the maturity of the relevant technologies is high 
[80]. Regasified LNG fed into the grid is no different from conventional 
pipeline natural gas, which is why no behaviour change is necessary and 
there is compatibility of actors along the value chain. The major inno-
vation in LNG is at the global level within the global innovation system 
[81].18 We hence focus our analysis of the socio-technical system on 
regime dynamics as characterised by the interlinkages of the (liquefied) 
natural gas regime and the influence of the global innovation system on 
national developments. 
Our data collection for the material analysis includes (1) informa-
tional interviews with scientific experts and NGO representatives, (2) 
the participation in information and dialogue events on the local and 
national level throughout 2019 and 2020, (3) hosting a stakeholder 
workshop with 15 participants from the private sector and civil society 
(e.g. companies involved in gas distribution, LNG terminal planning, 
energy consultants and environmental NGOs) in May 2019 and (4) a 
desk study of current literature. So far, there is limited scientific litera-
ture on the LNG terminals in Germany, so we also considered grey 
literature (e.g. company reports, newspaper articles, and protocols from 
political debates). 
4.2. Actor analysis 
In order to identify the relevant actors in our case and to understand 
their interests, we conducted an actor analysis following Brugha and 
Varvasovsky [82].19 Our methodological procedure can be divided into 
five steps. In the first three iterative steps, we identified and clustered 
the relevant actors (based on the material analysis) who exercise power 
and/or have a substantial interest in German natural gas developments. 
In the last two steps, we obtained the actors’ interests and perceptions, 
and analysed them. In the following, all steps are described in detail.20  
1. Identifying and clustering actors: We have used the results of the 
material analysis to identify all relevant actors. From this extensive 
list, the authors and two additional scientific experts in the German 
and international natural gas market selected the most relevant ac-
tors, clustered them into actor groups, identified their position 
(supportive, non-mobilised or opposed), the strength of their interest 
in the project (low, medium, high), and their possibility to influence 
the process (low, medium, high). In our case, this process resulted in 
an actor matrix that included 23 actor groups.  
2. Narrowing down the field: From that list, we excluded actor groups 
with only moderate or low interest and low or medium influence. In 
our case, this resulted in a matrix with no opposed actors. In order to 
avoid a bias in the investigation and to analyse the controversy 
around the terminals we included opposed actor groups.  
3. Categorising actor groups: We categorised the actor groups into 
state, private sector and civil society actors and relevant subgroups 
(see Fig. 3).  
4. Interviewing the relevant actor groups: We conducted 14 semi- 
structured interviews with actors from each of those three actor 
groups. The interviews took place between July and October 2019. 
Fig. 2. Actors influence the realms while the realms define the space for actors’ perceptions and related strategic actions. Source: Developed based on [16].  
Table 3 
Main variables covered in respective realms.  
Political Techno-economic Socio-technical 
State goals Resources Innovation systems 
Political interests Demand Regimes and niches 
Institutions and capacities Infrastructure Technology diffusion 
Note: See [16] for more detailed explanation of those variables. 
18 Generally, technological innovation processes take place and are influenced 
on various levels, such as regional, national and international, and those levels 
interrelate [81]. This conceptualisation of technological innovation as multi- 
locational and with structural couplings (termed global innovation system) is 
helpful in our case to analyse the influence of global developments on the 
diffusion of LNG technology in Germany. 
19 While the term ‘stakeholder’ is used mostly in management literature, 
‘actor’ is more common in the literature strand regarding energy transitions. To 
avoid confusion by using different terms, we always use ‘actor’ and therefore 
‘actor analysis’ instead of ‘stakeholder analysis’.  
20 Actor analysis as a methodology has been criticized for a lack of rigid 
criteria according to which actors are included or excluded from the analysis 
[83]. Therefore, we aim to present our approach as detailed and transparent as 
possible. 
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The interview guideline was structured in two parts, to identify both 
(1) the actors’ interests with regard to the LNG terminals and (2) 
their perception on the material developments affecting German 
natural gas markets in general. In our analysis, we can thus establish 
linkages between actor interests and their perceptions of de-
velopments. In order to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees 
we have assigned acronyms to the interviewees, which will be used 
in the further text when quoting (see Table 4).  
5. Analysing the interview results: We processed the interview data 
using qualitative content analysis [84]. We coded for the following 8 
categories to identify the main aspects regarding the actors’ interests 
and perceptions of the LNG terminals touching upon all three realms 
that could not be answered (solely) via a desktop research: 1) Actors’ 
interests in the specific LNG terminal proposals, as well as LNG and 
natural gas in general; 2) benefits and negative impacts of the ter-
minals; 3) barriers to terminal construction; 4) collaboration and 
connections between actors; 5) position towards terminals; 6) effect 
of synthetic gases and 7) natural gas market trends’ influence on LNG 
terminals; 8) possibilities and strategies of actors to influence polit-
ical decisions regarding the terminals. 
4.3. Triangulation of actor and material analysis 
Our methodological contribution is this 5-step approach on how to 
combine a material analysis with an interview-based actor analysis. 
Through this, we can use a wide variety of data (documents and inter-
view data) and cover both the realms and actors’ perceptions to analyse 
the resulting mechanisms influencing energy transitions. We link actors’ 
perceptions and interests with the material systems analysis (Section 5) 
and derive the most relevant mechanisms (Section 6), and are thereby 
able to answer the following questions: How do the material conditions 
around natural gas consumption and LNG infrastructure relate to and 
interact with relevant actors’ perceptions and interests? How do these 
interactions shape systemic changes and create lock-ins for the German 
energy transition? 
5. Results of realms and actor analysis 
The results are structured by realm: Section 5.1 presents the political 
realm with its competing state goals as well as actors’ perceptions of 
these state goals and political interests of key actors. Section 5.2 con-
trasts the natural gas supply and demand analysis with actors’ percep-
tions of techno-economic developments regarding LNG and natural gas 
markets in the techno-economic realm. Finally, Section 5.3 describes the 
socio-technical realm by comparing the LNG and synthetic gas tech-
nology diffusion with actor perspectives on innovation. For each realm, 
we reflect on the role lock-in plays. 
5.1. The political realm 
5.1.1. Competing state goals 
Gas infrastructure and the economics of LNG projects cannot be 
disentangled from the political environment. Politics here means two 
main things: the pursuit of state goals by political actors and the way in 
which private actors influence policy making. 
One important state goal for a country that signed the Paris Agree-
ment are greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. If Germany’s 
natural gas consumption stays at the 2018 level, emissions from natural 
gas alone (166 Mt CO2-eq) would account for more than a quarter of 
Germany’s total GHG emission target for 2030 (563 Mt CO2-eq), or 
almost all emissions available to the energy sector in 2030 (183 Mt CO2- 
eq), even without considering life-cycle emissions [8–11] (see Fig. 4). If 
Germany is to meet its climate targets, natural gas would need to be 
reduced in the final energy consumption already before 2030 (as other 
energy carriers such as coal will be responsible for a share of the emis-
sion target as well), and to almost zero by 2050 [85]. 
The main national state goal competing with climate protection is to 
balance energy demand with secure supply [44]. Following Cherp and 
Jewell [89], we define energy security as “low vulnerability of vital 
energy systems”. We operationalise this definition looking at how LNG 
terminal construction would affect risks from a) political and b) tech-
nological/natural origin, as well as c) resilience of the energy system. 
a) Risks of political origin can be diminished by reducing foreign con-
trol over energy systems.21 As Germany only produces a small share 
of its gas domestically, it will not obtain full sovereignty over its 
natural gas supply. In 2017, Germany’s energy import dependence 
was 64% overall, and 91% for natural gas [90]. An LNG terminal 
would not contribute to increasing energy sovereignty.  
b) The increase of the robustness of an energy system helps to minimise 
technological or natural (resource depletion) risks. The Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (henceforth Economics 
Ministry) states in its monitoring report on energy security and 
Fig. 3. Main actor groups involved in the political processes surrounding LNG 
Terminal construction in Germany. 
Table 4 
Summary of conducted interviews with acronyms.  
Number of 
interviews 
Interviewees Acronym* Position** 
4 State Actors 
(government, opposition, 
local and national) 
Interview_SA 1 supportive/1 
non-mobilised/2 
opposed 
2 Academic experts Interview_AE 1 opposed/1 
supportive 
2 Community Actor and 
NGO 
Interview_CA Opposed 
6 Private Sector Actors Interview_PSA 3 supportive/1 
opposed/2 non- 
mobilised 
* We identify the information used from the interviews by using the acronyms. 
** The position of the actors was not always known beforehand but determined 
through the analysis of the interviews. 
21 Commonly known in energy security literature as sovereignty [89]. 
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natural gas that supply of natural gas for Germany is “very secure” 
[91] and that even without German LNG Terminal import infra-
structure, via the EU internal market the worldwide LNG supply has 
a positive impact on German gas supply [91]. Nevertheless, the 
construction of the terminals can lead to a potential increase in 
robustness of gas supply security due to an increase of import 
capacities.  
c) Resilience aims to create the ability of energy systems to respond to 
disruptions. The major supply security concern is related to Russia 
[79,92]. Especially since 2006, due to Russian disputes with the 
transit countries Ukraine and Belarus, and annexation of Crimea, 
public and political concerns about potential supply disruptions were 
high [93–97]. To increase short-term resilience, LNG is unsuitable as 
contracting a new shipment and actual delivery would take in most 
cases several days. Only in the case of longer interruptions would the 
additional capacity of a terminal be useful. 
Thus, while LNG could increase reliance on foreign sources, and 
therefore decreasing the sovereignty of the German energy system, it 
could slightly increase its robustness and resilience by installing a young 
infrastructure, diversifying imported sources and providing a buffer 
against import shocks. Energy security is shaped not only by material 
realities but also by perceptions of key actors. 
One additional state goal, both on the national and the local level, is 
economic growth, which includes the provision of jobs as well as gen-
eration of revenues. 
5.1.2. Perceptions of state goals and political interests 
Central actors in the political system shaping LNG decisions are 
German national and local level state actors, natural gas interest asso-
ciations as well as other states. Among these actors, the Economics 
Ministry and the US Government are the most dominant in the public 
discourse. Non-state actors such as NGOs and community actors are also 
trying to influence the process but from a far less powerful position. 
The Economics Ministry is strongly supportive of LNG terminal 
construction in Germany, especially to reduce import dependency from 
Russia. However, the ministry also supports the construction of Nord 
Stream 2 and states that gas supply security is already high and can be 
guaranteed without the terminals. It sees synthetic gases and hydrogen 
imports as a possibility to bring LNG terminals in accordance with 
German climate protection targets [Interview_SA]. It also started the 
“Dialogue Process Gas 2030”, that reiterated the importance of LNG for 
diversification, and a resulting gas grid expansion [98].22 The Ministry 
of Environment has not positioned itself publicly for or against the 
terminals, although concerns have been voiced during the interview 
about negative environmental and climate impacts [Interview_SA]. 
Local state actors from the federal states, where the three potential 
terminals are located, are interested in the projects as they might lead to 
employment opportunities, improve the regions attractiveness for new 
corporations potentially related improvements in street, railway and gas 
grid infrastructures. In addition, regional and local politicians have an 
interest in private sector investment that might reduce the needed 
amount of public investment in structurally weak regions 
[Interview_SA].23 
The political support for the LNG Terminals is also influenced, both 
directly and indirectly, by other states, in particular the United States, 
Russia and the EU. Direct pressure to increase LNG imports comes from 
the US government, which aims to increase natural gas deliveries from 
the US to the EU (as part of the general strategy to keep their position as 
a natural gas exporter, which resulted from the shale gas fracking boom, 
see also 5.2.2). Several interviewees [Interview_SA × 3; Interview_AE; 
Interview_PSA; Interview_CA] alluded to the diplomatic pressure for the 
German government to follow the US government’s push to deliver gas 
to Germany, going so far as calling German state support for LNG a 
“friendship service” to the US [Interview_SA].24 On the other hand, in-
terviewees also mentioned concerns about a strong influence of Russia 
on the German natural gas market. Natural gas supplier diversification is 
often mentioned in the context of Russia being the largest gas supplier 
for Germany, and related vulnerability to natural gas price increases 
[Interview_SA; Interview_PSA]. 
Interest associations connect actors of the entire gas value chain in 
Fig. 4. Comparison of current emissions from gas consumption and emission reduction targets for Germany. Source: Authors’ illustration based on [86–88].  
22 Interestingly, despite being called a stakeholder dialogue process, 
throughout the process mostly industry, energy sector and consulting repre-
sentatives were part of it, while environmental NGOs were only included to-
wards the end.  
23 We interviewed a local representative from the Green Party, who positions 
himself against the terminals. He gave us an overview of reasons why other 
local politicians support the terminals. 
24 In a public statement the Economics minister also called it “a gesture to-
wards the US administration“; Reuters, Germany to build LNG plant in ’gesture’ 
to U.S. drive to sell more (2018). https://t1p.de/067b. 
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Germany, the EU and globally. Their general aim is to create business 
opportunities for firms in the gas industry, and to establish favourable 
political conditions for that. In Germany there are well-organised um-
brella interest associations representing the natural gas industry, e.g. the 
German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water (DVGW) 
or Zukunft Erdgas (‘Future Natural Gas’). They are generally in favour of 
the construction of LNG terminals in Germany, but are not directly (or at 
least not visibly) involved in lobbying for the terminals. In the case of the 
Brunsbüttel terminal, the interest organisation ‘Maritime LNG Platform’, 
is actively lobbying for its construction. The platform unites different 
actors, to create a larger negotiating power. They include industry actors 
(e.g., Shell, Vopak, MAN, Gasunie, FLUXYS) as well as harbour and 
shipping companies (Brunsbüttel Ports GmbH, AIDA Cruiser, Hapak- 
Lloyd). The interest of the association is to establish LNG as a fuel for 
both shipping and heavy-load road transport and to remove regulative 
barriers for LNG use [Interview_PSA; Interview_AE]. 
Opposition to the current LNG terminals comes from several Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), mostly due to climate change, 
but also general environmental and security concerns. A prominent 
example is DUH (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, Environmental Action Ger-
many), which conducted legal reports, publicly raising security and 
environmental concerns regarding the construction of the LNG termi-
nals. As a result, the operators in Wilhelmshaven need to find a different 
location for their FSRU, and in Brunsbüttel they are obliged to address 
the security concerns raised by the DUH as part of the approval process. 
Their overarching interest is to prevent the permission of investments 
that endanger local environments and negatively affect the climate 
[Interview_CA]. 
Local community actors are mostly indifferent to the realisation of 
the projects [Interview_SA; Interview_CA]. Several local actors are open 
to the project in the hope that additional jobs and an improvement of the 
local infrastructure will have a positive impact on them. However, some 
local citizen associations are actively against the terminals for envi-
ronmental reasons and security concerns [Interview_CA]. 
An institutional gas lock-in exists, as both private and political actors 
and institutions profit from existing and additional natural gas projects 
and their role for energy provision and security. Political and market 
actors have therefore jointly advanced further regulations which benefit 
natural gas, such as the change of the gas network regulation and bonus 
payments when natural gas replaces coal (see Section 6). Such inten-
tional choices further stabilise existing institutions, strengthening both 
national and international institutional connections. 
The discursive debate is between LNG and natural gas being a 
“bridge fuel” and a “partner of renewable energy” versus a “barrier to 
the energy transition” and an “environmental risk” [Interview_SA; 
Interview_CA; Interview_PSA; Interview_AE] [99]. It is part of the 
prevalent German energy transition and energy mix discourse since the 
2000s [51]. 
5.2. The techno-economic realm 
5.2.1. The German gas market and its European context 
Germany is the largest natural gas consumer in the EU. In 2018, the 
German gas consumption was 92 bcm [100]. This represents 23% of the 
primary energy consumption [100,101], while for example renewable 
energy sources contributed around 14% [101]. In 2018, natural gas 
accounted for 8% of electricity, 45% of the heating sector and 0.2% in 
the transport sector [102].25 In total, natural gas accounts for 24% of 
Germany’s CO2-eq emissions.26 
Importantly, Germany’s gas supply depends on other countries, as 
the country imports more than 90% of its natural gas consumption: In 
2018, 44 bcm came from Russia, 34 bcm from the Netherlands and 
22 bcm from Norway (3 bcm unspecified, 33 bcm re-exports) 
[100,103,104]. Germany has an extensive gas infrastructure, which 
includes more than 515,000 km of gas pipelines, cross border connec-
tions to all its neighbours, as well as Russia and Norway, as well as the 
largest gas storage capacities in the EU (~23 bcm, corresponding to 
around a quarter of annual German consumption) [85,105]. Several 
planned gas infrastructure investments include a second pipeline to 
Russia (Nord Stream 2), a second pipeline from the Baltic Coast to the 
Czech Republic (EUGAL), and converting pipelines and appliances 
running on low-calorific gas to high-calorific gas (due to decreasing 
imports from the Netherlands). The gas grids are highly regulated and 
managed by gas transmission system operators (16 companies) and gas 
distribution network operators (greater than700 different companies). 
Due to its geographical location and existing storage facilities, Germany 
acts as a “gas hub” for Europe [106]. 
In contrast to Germany, the EU as a whole already has considerable 
LNG import capacities – sufficient to cover around 43% of its current gas 
demand (as of 2015) [107]. The largest import capacities are in Spain, 
followed by the UK and France [108].27 The average utilisation rate of 
EU LNG terminals varies over time – in 2011 the utilisation rate was only 
around 50% and it decreased to less than 25% in 2017 before rising in 
2019 to the 2011 level [109–111]. LNG imported via a terminal can then 
be used either in its liquid form, or it can be regasified and put into the 
gas grid. 
5.2.2. Natural gas supply and demand analysis 
Current security of supply concerns stem from the fact that conti-
nental European natural gas production is declining. The Netherlands 
plan to phase-out gas production from the Groningen field in 2022 [112] 
and there is a widespread belief that the Norwegian gas fields are in 
decline [113,114] (however, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate ar-
gues that production from currently undeveloped fields could lead to an 
increase in Norwegian exports [115,116]). 
The growing global LNG market has attracted more actors in recent 
years, among them the US [117] driven by the fracking boom, which 
resulted in an in a ten-fold increase in exports in only four years [118]. 
Support for LNG originates in the aim to decrease imports from Russia. 
Yet, in 2019, Russia was the second largest LNG supplier to the EU (with 
Qatar being the largest supplier).28 Hence, it is possible that in case of 
LNG terminal construction, Germany would also buy more LNG from 
Russia than the US, which would prevent the desired supplier 
diversification. 
For LNG consumption economic prospects have improved, however 
not enough to make investments in LNG terminals profitable enough for 
quick private sector investments in Germany. Final investment decisions 
have been repeatedly postponed for Brunsbüttel as well as Wilhelm-
shaven. Concerns about demand for natural gas are exacerbated by 
COVID-19 [119]. 
In 2018, 45% of heat production in Germany came from natural gas 
[102]. Expansion of renewable energy use for heating has stalled since 
2012 [120]. Since the German coal phase-out law from July 2020 
financially incentivises the conversion from coal-fired power plants not 
only to renewable energies but also to natural gas, it is unlikely that the 
overall demand for natural gas in heat provision will fall. Gas use in the 
electricity sector depends on whether renewable energy and efficiency 
25 Umweltbundesamt, Energieverbrauch nach Energieträgern und Sektoren 
(2021). https://www.umweltbundesamt. 
de/daten/energie/energieverbrauch-nach-energietraegern-sektoren. 
26 Statista, Energiebedingte CO2-Emissionen in Deutschland nach Ener-
gieträger im Jahresvergleich 2000 und 2018, (2020). https://t1p.de/84q6. 
27 Terminals exist also in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, 
Poland, Lithuania, and Malta.  
28 In 2019, Russia exported 16 Mt of LNG to the EU, while the US exported 12 
Mt (Qatar as largest supplier delivered 21 Mt to the EU) (according to S&P 
Global Platts data, for quarterly data see EC [110]); Petroleum Economist, 
Russia beating US in LNG price war (2020). https://t1p.de/7mb5. 
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improvements will compensate for the phase-out of coal and nuclear 
energy. The transport sector in Germany is under pressure to achieve its 
emission reduction targets. LNG would provide several actors of the 
mobility sector with the chance to change towards a fuel, which is 
similar to their old business model from a technology perspective, while 
being able to reduce emissions of several pollutants. For this reason, 
there is currently a trend to use more LNG in transport (especially heavy- 
duty traffic and shipping; the absolute amounts of natural gas use are 
nevertheless still very small, see Section 5.2.1). Subsidies and other 
beneficial regulations implemented for LNG in the transport sector 
include e.g. a reduction in energy taxation for natural gas for vehicles 
[121,122], the exemption of LNG trucks from toll charges, and the 
creation an official “LNG-Taskforce”.29 However, studies show that 
switching to LNG in the transport sector does not necessarily lead to a 
reduction of GHGs [123].30 Other countries, such as the UK, have 
decided in their mobility strategy not to consider LNG as a climate 
friendly fuel option.31 
In contrast to some actors’ expectations of an increasing natural gas 
demand, a multi-model comparison shows that in modelling results in 
line with the Paris Agreement (or merely an 80% GHG emission 
reduction by 2050) natural gas demand decreases, even before 2030 
[85,124]. A study by the German Environmental Agency shows that 
ambitious climate protection would render unnecessary up to 74% of all 
gas distribution grids due to a reduction in gas consumption [125]. 
5.2.3. Economic interests of key actors 
In general, gas market actors, such as gas traders, pipeline operators 
and utilities, have an interest in increasing gas consumption in Germany. 
An expansion of the gas infrastructure and additional natural gas im-
ports can strengthen their business and increase the value of their asset, 
whereas a strong decline of gas consumption would negatively affect 
their business models. Gas traders have an interest in the flexibility 
provided by LNG in contrast to pipeline gas, as one terminal can be used 
to import gas from a variety of suppliers and offers the possibility of 
short term contracting in case of a changing gas demand or prices 
[Interview_PSA]. Utilities experience pressure due to the nuclear and 
coal phase-out and the need to find dispatchable sources. Gas is close to 
their old business model and therefore a convenient substitute. 
The industry sector was responsible for 40% of Germany’s total gas 
and 47% of its electricity consumption in 2018. Industrial actors have, 
hence, a particular interest in low gas prices, for cheap electricity and 
heat provision, as well as feedstock [Interview_PSA x2; Interview_AE]. 
International suppliers have an interest to access the largest European 
gas market to sell their LNG. 
Gas grid operators’ business model is threatened by a potential 
reduction in gas demand. They could benefit from an increase in gas 
throughput in case of LNG deliveries, especially the ones connecting 
pipelines and the ones close by. Another option are synthetic gases, 
which is why some gas grid operators start investing in “hydrogen 
ready” infrastructure. 
For actors in the mobility sector, LNG is an opportunity to meet 
short-term emission reduction targets (e.g. CO2, NOx, SOx), opening 
investment opportunities for trucks, long-distance shipping and inland 
vessels and related infrastructure, such as filling stations [Interview_AE, 
Interview_PSA]. 
Relatively few of the gas market actors are opposed to the LNG 
terminal construction in Germany. One example is an association of 
municipal utilities, which opposes the allocation of the access pipelines’ 
costs to gas customers, but not the terminals themselves [126]. 
Germany has a well-developed natural gas infrastructure that many 
actors are interested to continue to avoid stranded assets. An infra-
structural natural gas lock-in exists due to the long lifetime and large 
sunk costs of existing infrastructure. Additional investments would 
reinforce the infrastructural lock-in. Especially in the heat sector, a 
strong technological lock-in exists, as renewable heating alternatives are 
not yet widespread and would require a different infrastructure, 
rendering e.g. the natural gas distribution network unnecessary [61]. 
5.3. The socio-technical realm 
5.3.1. Gas regime technology diffusion and synthetic gas niche 
The natural gas regime is influential. It is dominant and well con-
nected across different sectors (electricity, heat, industry, and to an 
increasing extent transport) and actors (gas network operators, corpo-
rations of various industries using gas as input for heat or as feedstock, 
manufacturers of gas appliances, municipal and nationwide utilities, gas 
storage operators, traders, several political actors, etc.), through, for 
example, joint interest associations. LNG is a part of the highly institu-
tionalised natural gas regime, as the actors and formal and informal 
rules are mostly the same, and one of the shared beliefs is that natural 
gas should play an important role in the energy transition. 
There is an emerging synthetic gas niche, to utilise (renewable) elec-
tricity to produce hydrogen with electrolysers [127].32 Hydrogen has 
long been promoted as an alternative (see e.g. IEA [128] for “previous 
waves of enthusiasm for hydrogen” since the 1970 s) and this trend has 
re-emerged now in connection with increasing pressure on the natural 
gas regime [54,129].33 To produce renewable synthetic gases domesti-
cally, Germany would need to substantially expand the capacity of 
electrolysers, but also additional renewable energy capacities to produce 
the needed electricity [127,130,131]. Due to space constraints for 
additional renewable capacities and related societal opposition, imports 
of synthetic gases would need to play a substantial role [130,131]. The 
assumptions about imports are made without actual existing projects in 
other countries on the required scale to provide those import possibil-
ities, and partnerships are in an early stage. 
In the debate about the LNG terminals, the possibility to use the 
planned terminals for hydrogen imports is often mentioned, despite the 
fact that the technical requirements are very different for hydrogen and 
not fulfilled by the terminal (see [132] for a comparison of LNG and 
liquid hydrogen properties). Synthetic methane could potentially be 
imported via the terminals, but the costs and available supplies are still 
highly uncertain. 
In general, the high level of natural gas use in various sectors facil-
itates support for LNG. The (liquefied) natural gas regime also shares 
many rules, values and goals with the synthetic gas niche, creating in 
many instances a further alliance instead of competition. 
5.3.2. Actor perceptions of innovation 
Various private sector actors and state actors referred to the possi-
bility of importing synthetic gases (i.e. hydrogen) via the terminals 
[Interview_PSA x2; Interview_SA]. However, there is not a large market 
for synthetic gases and market actors stated that they had no concrete 
plans for those imports, as the uncertainty about price developments and 
29 Dena, Liquefied natural gas: LNG Task force defines work priorities (2016). 
https://t1p.de/kgc2. Dena, LNG-Taskforce und Initiative Erdgasmobilität 
(2021). https://t1p.de/6fhc.  
30 The reduction of GHGs depends on various factors, such as the origin of the 
fuel, the engine design and the associated methane leakage. Depending on how 
these factors interact, a possible reduction of GHG is between − 20% and +3%.  
31 GOV.UK, Written statement to Parliament Clean maritime plan (2019). 
https://t1p.de/0k95. 
32 In a second step – the methanisation – hydrogen can be converted into 
methane.  
33 One example for the pressure is the company ‘Total’ complaining about the 
European Investment Bank stopping to finance investments in unabated gas 
projects, from 2021 onwards, stating that “Gas has never been so much criti-
cised in Europe”; Reuters, UPDATE 1-Energy group Total criticises EIB’s deci-
sion not to finance gas (2019). https://t1p.de/1cz7. 
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possible suppliers is too high. Nevertheless, synthetic gases are strongly 
present in the discourse on the energy transition. One important actor in 
this context is the “Power to X Alliance”. Among the members of this 
association are car manufacturers, transmission grid operators and 
natural gas traders.34 The alliance demands the construction of 5 GW 
electrolyser capacity35 by 2025 and changes to regulation to facilitate 
the market entry of ‘Power to X’ technologies.36 Central actors from the 
renewable industry, like the umbrella association of renewable en-
ergy37, are not part of it. 
Hydrogen does influence the debate in the socio-technical realm and 
could encourage some actors to support the construction of the termi-
nals. However, given the still immature technological development and 
incompatibility of hydrogen with LNG import terminal technology, it is 
unlikely that there will be any actual synergies. 
The natural gas regime is well connected to political actors. Regime 
actors use their resources to promote their technological preferences, 
create strong networks, achieve beneficial regulation, a supportive 
public discourse, and mobilise public funding for their projects.38 The 
combination of the efforts of regime actors creates effective regime 
resistance. 
Generally, LNG and synthetic gases relate to a behavioural lock-in of 
natural gas, as utilities and other companies are used to large-scale en-
ergy infrastructure and trade, and customers are familiar and satisfied 
with gas boilers and district heating grids. Regasified LNG requires no 
change of standards or any change in behaviour of consumers or com-
panies along the value chain, enabling the continuation of the status 
quo. 
6. Mechanisms explaining LNG support in Germany 
The main mechanisms to explain political support for LNG terminals 
are summarised in Fig. 5. The three realms are linked through the 
relevant actors, which enhance co-evolution via their actions. The 
mechanisms can explain the observed reciprocal developments of the 
three realms as well as perceptions and actions by the actors. The 
mechanisms are explained in detail in the following and can be divided 
in those that represent one form of lock-in (defined in Section 3), and 
those that more generally support natural gas as a technology. 
A – Pressure on German state actors to support LNG through 
international diplomacy: Institutional lock-in 
One of the general mechanisms that creates political support for LNG 
terminals is international diplomacy: Since the shale gas boom turned 
the US into a natural gas exporter (see Section 5.2.2), the Trump 
administration was putting increasing pressure on both the EU as a 
whole and Germany in particular to import more gas from the US. The 
outcome of national dynamics in other countries is included here, 
however, a detailed analysis of those dynamics – e.g. what is leading US 
politicians to act the way they do – is beyond the boundaries of the 
analysis and the framework. 
Illustrative for this mechanism are for example meetings between US 
and European state actors regarding the so called “trade war” in July 
2018, when EU commissioner Juncker and US President Trump agreed 
on EU purchases of LNG from the US in the context of the threat of US 
punitive trade tariffs. Since then, LNG imports from the US to the EU 
have risen sharply, albeit from a very low level [134,135]. Reasons for 
the increase are, however, not only the political pressure but also 
various global LNG market developments (see Introduction and Section 
5.2). A conference on US LNG organised by the German Economics 
Ministry in February 2019 is another illustration for the pressure the US 
is putting on the German government to support imports of US LNG: 
Only US politicians and corporations but no actors e.g. from Qatar or 
Russia were invited. As a preliminary result of the conference, a key- 
issues paper of the Economics ministry proposed the changes to the 
network regulation in favour of LNG infrastructure projects [136]. In 
December 2019, the US officially imposed sanctions on companies 
involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, against which the US 
government has officially positioned itself.39 Together, the measures 
taken by the US – trying to stop more infrastructure enabling gas imports 
from Russia and pushing the EU to import US LNG – are putting the 
German state in a difficult situation: It needs to respond to this larger 
geopolitical conflict between Russia and the US, while aiming to guar-
antee high supply security and low energy prices. In this context, finance 
minister Scholz proposed in a now publicly available non-paper to the 
US Secretary of the Treasury that Germany would support the Bruns-
büttel and Wilhelmshaven LNG terminals with up to €1 billion, if in 
return the US would stop sanctions related to Nord Stream 2.40 
The simultaneously decreasing natural gas production in central 
Europe (especially in the Netherlands and possibly Norway) reinforces 
beliefs of various actors that Germany and the EU as a whole are 
vulnerable to Russian gas supplies, which in turn intensifies mechanism 
B. 
What makes the German gas market particularly attractive to the US 
is its size and that it acts as a gas hub in Europe. Thus, while other Eu-
ropean countries will be subject to similar supply constraints from 
decreasing continental European gas production, it is not clear if the US 
Fig. 5. Explanatory mechanisms for political support for LNG investments in 
Germany. Notes: Each mechanism is designated by a specific colour and letter. 
A – International diplomacy pressures German state actors to support LNG; B – 
State actors support incumbents to ensure a secure supply–demand balance; C – 
Regimes enable beneficial regulation through promoting the alignment of their 
vested interests with political interests; D - Sunk investments reduce willingness 
for change; E - Niche innovations strengthen the gas regime; F – Weak oppo-
sition of actors outside the regime poses no counterweight. Source: Adopted 
from [36]. 
34 Power to X Allianz, Allianzpartner (2021). https://www.ptx-allianz. 
de/ueber-uns/allianzpartner/.  
35 Used to generate hydrogen from electricity.  
36 Power to X Allianz, 10-Punkte-Plan zur Nationalen Wasserstoffstrategie – 
Power to X durch Anwendungsoffenheit zum Erfolg führen. (2021). https://t1p. 
de/aw16. ‘Power to X’ refers to the conversion of electricity to gases, heat, or 
liquids, often used to improve storability of electricity.  
37 German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE).  
38 Next to the support for LNG, the German hydrogen strategy, provides e.g. €7 
billion for the creation of a hydrogen industry [133]. 
39 SEC. 7503, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.pdf.  
40 Federal Ministry of Finance, Non Paper Germany Nord Stream 2/U.S. LNG 
(2020). https://t1p.de/s7cq. 
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would put the same pressure on other European countries. 
B – State actors support incumbents to ensure a secure sup-
ply–demand balance: Institutional lock-in 
In consideration of the decreasing natural gas production within the 
EU and internationally low LNG prices, the support of private sector 
investments in LNG terminals can help state actors to create higher 
supply security levels by facilitating imports from additional supplier 
states (or at least the perception of higher energy security) (see Section 
5.1.1). This mechanism therefore represents an institutional lock-in 
mechanism. On the international supply side, the aforementioned 
decreasing European natural gas production increases supply security 
concerns, and low international LNG prices reduce the barrier for in-
vestments and increase the attractiveness of natural gas use. 
The extent to which supply security would actually increase through 
the LNG terminals is contentious for various reasons: (1) LNG might not 
be contracted and shipped rapidly enough to function as an emergency 
supply mechanism [Interview_PSA], (2) LNG supplies might come from 
Russia and therefore may not provide diversification, (3) the Economics 
Ministry states that supply security would also be guaranteed without 
the construction [Interview_SA], (4) as well as studies showing that EU 
gas supply is secure without new investments [92,137]. 
Despite a rather small increase in supply security and the repeated 
statement that the LNG terminals are a private sector investment 
(Interview_SA, Interview_PSA, Deutscher Bundestag [138]), the federal 
and state governments support the construction in various ways, to close 
acknowledged “substantial profitability gaps”41. The main measure by 
the government was the change of the Gas Network Access Regulation in 
March 2019. Thus, the Economics Ministry overturned a previous de-
cision by the German network regulator (BNetzA) from December 2018 
that investors would have to bear the cost for pipelines connecting the 
terminals to the gas grid themselves.42 Now, 90% of the investment costs 
and 100% of the operating costs for the connecting pipelines will have to 
be borne by gas consumers through a rise in network charges.43 Inter-
estingly, the related entire political process was only several weeks long, 
which has been evaluated as unusually quick and surprising by different 
interviewees [Interview_PSA x2]. For these connecting pipelines, addi-
tional changes to the rest of the gas grid become necessary, as it would 
not have sufficient capacities to transfer the additional supplies. These 
additional grid expansion plans might cause additional costs of €800 
million, which would again have to be borne by gas consumers and not 
the terminal operators [139]. 
The terminals are also financially supported through direct federal 
state subsidies for LNG terminal construction44 and through the com-
mon task budget “Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure”.45 
Further political support for the terminals consists of general govern-
mental support, such as economics minister Altmaier stating repeatedly 
that he expects the construction of terminals to go ahead, as it would be 
good for supply security, and encouraging companies to apply for public 
funding.46 The relevance of this becomes starker when compared to the 
stalling wind energy expansion without increasing political support. The 
financial as well as discursive governmental support is particularly 
interesting, as no final investment decision has been made yet by any of 
the potential project investors. This suggests that the terminals are not 
necessarily financially viable without supportive measures. 
The parallel coal and nuclear phase-outs increase the pressure on 
private sector and state actors to ensure a stable and affordable energy 
provision. Besides the technical requirements, especially state actors 
also need to create public trust in their strategy to achieve this. A well- 
known and established energy source, such as natural gas, continues to 
be promoted as a reliable and relatively climate friendly fuel. It is 
claimed that natural gas can fill this role more easily than renewables 
and new storage technologies. Effectively, climate concerns and envi-
ronmental concerns are thereby dominated by short-term economic and 
energy security concerns (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). 
The German coal commission and coal phase-out law illustrate po-
litical side games regarding natural gas: While the process of negotiating 
the pathway and related support for affected regions and companies was 
supposed to focus on coal, natural gas is mentioned repeatedly. New gas 
power plants are now to be granted a facilitated construction process 
[140], and the coal phase-out law47 encourages the conversion of coal- 
fired power plants to gas via a financial “coal replacement bonus” 
(Kohleausstiegsgesetz § 7c). 
Several elements of this mechanism are likely to be replicated also in 
other EU countries48: That states work with incumbents to ensure a 
supply–demand balance is a well-known phenomenon, and refers to an 
institutional lock-in [16]. Like Germany, other countries, such as Spain, 
Portugal or the United Kingdom, are now in the next phase of their 
energy transition, where they are phasing out coal, and face an increase 
in natural gas use. 
C – Regimes enable beneficial regulation through promoting the 
alignment of their vested interests with political interests: Regime 
resistance 
Gas regime actors promote their vested interests as to be aligned with 
local governments’ and communities’ interests. For example, when the 
proposals for the LNG terminal were presented to local politicians in 
Brunsbüttel (a comparatively structurally weak region), hopes for 
infrastructure improvements, such as railways and roads, were specif-
ically addressed [Interview_SA]. In addition, potential positive effects, 
such as local jobs or tax revenues, were used to argue for financial and 
regulatory support. 
Another strategy of private sector regime actors is to threaten state 
actors with moving their projects abroad. Since this would harm the 
local economy, politicians are more inclined to create support for their 
business. For instance, in Brunsbüttel, Yara49 has mentioned to local 
policy-makers the possibility to close its production facilities, if the LNG 
terminal and a resulting better gas grid connection would not be built 
[Interview_SA]. 
“So the entire area is too poorly connected to the natural gas grid. The 
industry companies now come and say, if that won’t get better […] then 
we won’t invest here in the future. Of course, this also causes fear and 
41 E.g. by the Federal Government Coordinator for the Maritime Industry 
Norbert Brackmann or the State Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Transport, Employment, Technology and Tourism of Land Schleswig-Holstein 
Thilo Rohlfs, Handelsblatt, Warum Deutschlands erstes Flüssiggas-Terminal 
ein Befreiungsschlag wäre (2018). https://t1p.de/txb3.  
42 BMWi, Verordnung zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für den 
Aufbau der LNG-Infrastruktur in Deutschland (2019) https://t1p.de/2jqn. 
(Ordinance to improve the framework conditions for the development of LNG 
infrastructure in Germany).  
43 Telepolis, "Erdgas wird die neue Kohle" (2019). https://www.heise. 
de/tp/features/Erdgas-wird-die-neue-Kohle-4398966.html.  
44 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Finanzausschuss stimmt Investitionspaket zu (2020). 
https://t1p.de/u4o7.  
45 Besides that, natural gas and LNG consumption are encouraged through a 
wide variety of different measures, e.g. the mobility and fuel strategy [138], as 
well as via tax rebates for LNG use, financial benefits for research and devel-
opment and the development of LNG fuelling infrastructure [153,154]. 
46 Telepolis, "Erdgas wird die neue Kohle" (2019). https://www.heise. 
de/tp/features/Erdgas-wird-die-neue-Kohle-4398966.html.  
47 Bundesregierung. 2020. Gesetz zur Reduzierung und zur Beendigung der 
Kohleverstromung und zur Änderung weiterer Gesetze (Kohleausstiegsgesetz).  
48 Currently, LNG import terminals are under construction in Finland, Italy, 
Poland and Spain, while proposals exist in Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom [141].  
49 Yara is one of the five single biggest gas consumers in Germany (0.7 bcm in 
Brunsbüttel; ~1% of German gas consumption). Boyens Medien, Gute Ernte: 
Yara in Brunsbüttel (2018). https://t1p.de/ftxs. 
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panic. There’s no question about that. Of course, they pursue their own 
interests […], and we as the little volunteer councillors here, get told so. 
And then you are confronted with a responsibility. […] You can’t just 
dismiss it and say it’s shenanigans, what they say, it is definitely not. 
There is a good bit of truth in it somehow. But it’s hard for us to judge 
whether they won’t invest more in the future or whether it’s just one of 
those threatening backdrops that are being built up.” [Interview_SA]. 
This direct lobbying works especially well through strong existing 
networks between the natural gas industry, interest associations and 
politicians. For example, companies involved in the LNG terminal payed 
political lobby institutions, such as the von Beust & Coll consulting, to 
advocate for the terminals50 [Interview_PSA]. The consulting firm 
created the “Maritime LNG Plattform e.V.” (see Section 5.1.2), which 
unites various actors along the value chain. Jointly they benefit from a 
more advantageous position to lobby state actors for political support. 
The consulting firm directly advertises their influence through using 
different party contacts, known from former political work [Inter-
view_PSA x2] (e.g. from Ole von Beust, the former mayor from Hamburg 
from 2001 to 2010).51 
A main strategy from larger gas interest associations is to present 
natural gas as a benefit for supply security, affordable energy, and as 
necessary for economic growth. The gas industry also advocates for the 
“partnership” between renewables and gas [142], again managing to 
create at least the perception of complementarity instead of 
competition. 
This is also the case when LNG terminals are framed as a means to 
import “green gases”. Noteworthy is the presentation of plans to use the 
terminals in the long run for hydrogen, despite the different technical 
requirements that would need a different terminal design and substan-
tial reconstructing with high costs [132] (see also Section 5.3). 
In general, the gas regime managed to introduce the narrative of gas 
being ‘climate and environmentally friendly’ and a ‘bridge fuel’ in the 
public discourse (see also [6]). These cognitive frames have not been 
significantly challenged yet by opposition, which is why they contribute 
to reinforcing misguided public beliefs and facilitate gaining public and 
political support [143]. 
This strategy is a well-observed phenomenon in many countries. On 
the European level, since 2010, the five main oil and gas corporations 
and their lobby groups have spent at least €250 million to influence 
European decision-making.52 Together these different strategies repre-
sent a form of lock-in termed regime resistance, used by the regime to 
shape ideas about problems and solutions, to advance their own in-
terests, and to prevent stronger regulation. While the strategy has 
oftentimes proven successful, it is worth noting that in some EU coun-
tries, such as Sweden, natural gas has not been strengthened substan-
tially despite an advanced, next phase [15] of the energy transition. 
D – Sunk investments reduce willingness for change: Infra-
structural lock-in 
An important barrier to using less natural gas are past investments: 
The related sunk costs push actors to keep using that infrastructure, as 
they cannot recover the already incurred costs. This mechanism is, 
hence, a form of infrastructural lock-in. Incumbents have an incentive to 
frame gas infrastructure as a valuable asset that should be used long- 
term. However, almost two-thirds of all gas distribution grids would 
not be needed anymore for natural gas distribution, if climate targets 
were to be fulfilled (see Section 5.2.2). One relatively small change for 
distribution grid operators or power plants is to invest in so-called 
“hydrogen ready” infrastructure.53 This vague term encompasses infra-
structure with varying capabilities to integrate hydrogen (between 
single-digit percentage levels and 100%), mostly creating a further lock- 
in but no systemic changes. Additional investments in gas infrastructure 
lead to an increase of an already existing gas lock-in. The scale is, among 
other factors, dependent on the expected lifetime of investments and the 
financial barrier to switch to renewable alternatives as well as system- 
wide institutional effects [67,144]. Most gas infrastructure has rela-
tively long expected lifetimes, e.g. LNG terminals at least 20–40 years, 
new ships equipped with LNG as power unit ~ 65 years, and gas-fired 
power plants at least 20–30 years. The quantitative analysis of the 
additional lock-in’s extent is beyond the scope of this analysis and re-
mains a proposal for future research. 
E – Niche innovations strengthen the gas regime 
States often nurture niches in parallel with working with in-
cumbents, and do not choose either or (as e.g. shown in [36]). The 
German state supports the strengthening of the niche by financially 
supporting domestic synthetic gas production (e.g. electrolysers for 
hydrogen production). Additionally, imports of synthetic gases (i.e. 
renewable methane and hydrogen) are discussed and cooperation with 
other states is planned [133]. 
However, the gas case is special, as the natural gas regime builds a 
network with the gas niche: The synthetic gas niche, including diverse 
synthetic and renewable gases (see [145,146] for a typology), poses no 
competition to natural gas yet, but actually supports the natural gas 
regime (of which the LNG regime is a part), as it consists of very similar 
infrastructure and actors. Even strong growth of synthetic gases (via 
domestic production or imports) would not constitute a competition for 
the gas regime but mostly a useful new element to it (e.g. increased 
supply for the gas grid and power plants, new investment opportunities 
for equipment suitable for a high hydrogen share, etc.). It would also not 
imply major changes of rules or routines. Therefore, we find that the 
synthetic gas niche (e.g. hydrogen) is not a threat but a complement to 
the existing natural gas regime. 
Despite the slow development of the various synthetic and biogenic 
gases (little investment, high costs, limited space and partly missing 
technological readiness), political debates are prominent and (financial) 
political support has already been promised (see e.g. Germany’s 
hydrogen strategy [133]). 
This mechanism may also be replicated at the EU level and in other 
European countries, as the new prominence of synthetic gases in policy 
debates is increasing rapidly. 
F – Weak opposition of actors outside the regime poses no 
counterweight 
Opposition to natural gas in Germany is now slowly emerging. The 
most visible one is DUH, which commissioned legal reports on the 
Brunsbüttel, Stade and Wilhelmshaven terminals, raising concerns about 
the legal feasibility of approval for the terminals. For Brunsbüttel, 
feasibility is disputed especially on grounds of security risks, e.g. due to 
the immediate vicinity of a nuclear power plant and an interim storage 
facility for radioactive waste [147]. For the FSRU in Wilhelmshaven, 
environmental and safety concerns evolve especially around extensive 
waterway construction, continuous maintenance dredging works, and 
the location being close to several nature protection zones [148]. The 
legal reports see the construction of the terminals as incompatible with 
the existing major accident laws in all three locations, as well as the 
existing climate law [147–149]. The aspects mentioned in the legal 
50 In this case especially the Brunsbüttel terminal.  
51 They themselves call the platform the “joint” between economy and politics 
and “partners” of the economics and transport ministries. von Beust & Coll; 
https://www.vbcoll.de/.  
52 CEO, Food and Water Watch and Friends of the Earth Europe: Big Oil and 
gas buying influence in Brussels (2019). https://t1p.de/lxnb. 
53 Another possible response strategy would be to stop new investments in a 
coordinated way to avoid stranded investments. This happens in the 
Netherlands, where gas distribution operators pushed the government to 
introduce policies ending natural gas grid connections in new build homes, as 
they would not have been able to recover those costs when the Netherlands 
phase-out natural gas by 2050 [personal conversation with Dutch energy 
expert]. 
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reports need to be included in the approval processes of the terminals, 
such as the related planning permission hearings and the environmental 
impact assessments. This might have complicated or slowed down the 
approval [Interview_PSA]. Despite attempts by political actors at the 
state level to undermine the legitimacy of the legal report, the approval 
process for none of the terminals has been completed yet. Additionally, 
some local opposition by citizen initiatives exists. Those actors opposed 
to the terminals describe presswork as difficult, since e.g. the local 
newspapers benefit financially from advertisements by the terminal 
operators [Interview_CA]. 
In general, opposition by these few actors is small compared to the 
strong support by a wide variety of political and private actors in favour. 
NGOs and citizen initiatives are more fragmented and additionally their 
involvement targeting natural gas is much lower than e.g. compared to 
nuclear energy and coal, where they exerted strong opposition 
[150,151]. Opposition to LNG terminals is being organised in other 
constituencies than those of the LNG terminal locations, and jointly 
across countries. How German NGOs strategies (especially regarding the 
legal reports) influence LNG terminal construction might be used as 
lessons learned by other organisations. 
Together, those six mechanisms can explain political support for LNG 
in Germany. Four mechanisms (A, B, C & D) represent the institutional 
and infrastructure lock-in, as well as regime resistance. Additionally, 
two other mechanisms are not directly lock-in mechanisms, but still 
facilitate the development of LNG terminals and use of natural gas (E & 
F). Together, they illustrate the stable lock-in of natural gas in Germany: 
(1) An institutional lock-in of gas results from the pressure of inter-
national state actors and domestic incumbents. The course of 
political decisions is shifted due to the influence of special in-
terests to the expansion of natural gas use, and therefore the 
support of LNG. As the opposition has so far been weak, and the 
personal and institutional connections are not nearly as strong as 
the ones of the existing regime, it could not break up the existing 
institutional lock-ins. However, due to legal interference in the 
projects, the opposition might still have a large impact by at least 
delaying and potentially preventing the construction of the 
terminals.  
(2) An infrastructure lock-in is particularly related to potentially 
stranded assets of long-lived natural gas infrastructure, such as 
LNG terminals, but also pipelines and power plants. The fear of 
lost profits or destruction of values already prevents stronger 
regulation on natural gas, and would increase with additional 
infrastructure investments. As the synthetic gas niche does not 
pose an actual competition to the existing natural gas regime and 
would use the same infrastructure, the continuation or an even 
higher infrastructure lock-in is likely.  
(3) The behavioural lock-in is more important on the consumer side 
and the heating sector, but the LNG terminals nevertheless also 
illustrate a behavioural lock-in, as the natural gas industry can 
continue and potentially even strengthen the status quo of their 
business with additional LNG supplies. A behaviour change is 
unnecessary, as regasified LNG fed into the grid is no different 
from conventional pipeline gas. Regime resistance fostered po-
litical support and beneficial regulation and advances the in-
terests of the natural gas regime.  
(4) A discursive lock-in exists, as the narrative of gas being a ‘climate 
friendly’ ‘bridge fuel’ is still dominant in the public discourse. It 
prevents a necessary debate about the barriers natural gas poses 
to advanced energy transitions and the change towards renew-
able energies by justifying natural gas use. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analysed the case of LNG terminal investment plans 
and related state support in Germany. This is particularly interesting 
because Germany promotes an energy transition towards renewable 
energies, but risks an increasing lock-in of the fossil fuel natural gas, 
contradicting GHG emission reduction targets. We analysed the material 
conditions around natural gas consumption and LNG infrastructure, and 
the interaction with relevant actors’ perceptions and interests. This 
enabled us to identify the main lock-in mechanisms of LNG and natural 
gas, as well as other mechanisms generally supporting the role of natural 
gas in Germany. Together they can explain the political support for LNG 
terminal construction. 
By linking the lock-in concept with the meta-theoretical energy 
transitions framework by Cherp et al. [16] as well as an actor analysis, 
we make a theoretical contribution to the energy transitions literature: 
In particular, we showed how actors walk between different realms, 
which shape energy transitions to enable or block change. This rela-
tionship with lock-ins will become increasingly important as they are 
key to understanding inertia and change in accelerating energy transi-
tions. Our methodological contribution lies in a 5-step approach on how 
to combine a material analysis with an interview-based actor analysis. 
This comprehensive approach enabled us to identify six mechanisms 
creating state support for LNG terminals. Two mechanisms represent 
institutional lock-in: A) pressure on German state actors to support LNG 
through international diplomacy and B) state actors supporting in-
cumbents to ensure a secure supply–demand balance. Mechanism C) 
finding that regimes enable beneficial regulation through promoting the 
alignment of their vested interests with political interests is a form of 
regime resistance, while mechanism D) is a case of infrastructural lock- 
in, as sunk investments reduce the willingness for change. Two other 
mechanisms benefit natural gas’s position in general: E) niche in-
novations strengthening the natural gas regime, and F) a weak opposi-
tion posing no counterweight to the regime. 
In general, the strength of a well-anchored gas regime would be 
threatened by an ambitious climate policy. Thus, political lobbying tries 
to increase gas consumption in various sectors and construct new gas 
import capacities. Germany, despite its relatively high climate ambition, 
is providing strong state support to LNG, which risks leading to an 
increasing natural gas lock-in, even as natural gas consumption today is 
already inconsistent with future climate targets. 
The development of German gas is interesting from a climate 
perspective, given that the country represents almost 25% of EU-27 
natural gas consumption in 2019 [152]. Additionally, we deem the 
German case to hold lessons for the development of LNG in other Eu-
ropean countries as they reach the ‘next phase’ of the energy transition. 
Many European countries already use natural gas, and now face similar 
challenges to Germany of managing a coal phase-out along with growing 
variable shares of renewables. We hold that our findings are particularly 
relevant to those countries in a similar energy situation and with a 
coastline to possibly install more LNG terminals, such as Spain, Portugal, 
or the United Kingdom.54 How the international and national factors we 
identified play out in different states will shape to what extent the in-
sights from the German LNG case are transferrable. All EU countries 
have closely linked energy markets. Diplomatic pressure from exporting 
countries could be a major challenge for the next phase of the energy 
transition. However, the degree of pressure they receive from interna-
tional actors may differ due to the relative size and importance of their 
markets in the EU gas markets. 
The perception of natural gas as a comparatively clean fuel and its 
link to synthetic gas will likely shape the development of LNG in all 
states. The discourse on and optimism about synthetic gases strengthens 
the natural gas regime generally, as they open a window of opportunity 
for political inertia in the sense that no unpopular decisions on a demand 
reduction have to be taken. Instead, the status quo can be prolonged 
with the promise that natural gas will be replaced by synthetic gases at a 
54 In Spain, two further terminals are currently under construction, while in 
the UK a proposal for an addition terminal exists. 
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later stage of the transition process. With the current immaturity of these 
technologies, this is a risky path. The relative importance of this lock-in 
mechanism will be shaped by the role of natural gas and synthetic gases 
in the countries’ decarbonisation strategies. Finally, the well-observed 
phenomenon of states working with incumbents will likely be repli-
cated. However, the strength of the natural gas regimes varies as well as 
the perception of the importance of natural gas for energy security. 
As this is a case study on only one country, preliminary conclusions 
for other countries need to interpreted with caution. Also, more aspects 
of the natural gas sector besides LNG need to be analysed to understand 
the full lock-in. Another limitation of this research is that actors might 
have had incentives not to share all of their actual interests and plans in 
the interviews, which in turn might have altered the findings. As further 
research, we deem valuable a quantification of the GHG lock-in, and 
further qualitative analyses of natural gas lock-ins in other countries and 
sectors. 
The main resulting recommendation for policy-makers would be to 
include lock-in risks in calculations for their decision-making: Especially 
when planning the ongoing energy transition, the risks for an acceler-
ated transition posed by stranded asset, but also institutional, infra-
structural, behavioural and discursive lock-ins need to be accounted for. 
To avoid an increasing natural gas lock-in and resulting negative eco-
nomic and ecological impacts, natural gas infrastructure investments 
would need to be aligned with climate policy targets, and not only seen 
in a security of supply context. Otherwise, natural gas could crowd out 
investments in renewables and thereby slow down the shift to low- 
carbon energy sources. In addition, measurements of methane emis-
sions and targets for methane emission reductions could help to reduce 
the climate impact. We also want to encourage further research on the 
role of natural gas in energy transitions, and the question how an 
increasing lock-in can be prevented. 
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I. Korsbakken, C. Le Quéré, A. Peregon, Carbon dioxide emissions continue to 
grow amidst slowly emerging climate policies, Nat. Clim. Change. 10 (2020) 3–6, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0659-6. 
[2] A. Neumann, C. von Hirschhausen, Natural gas: an overview of a lower-carbon 
transformation fuel, Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy. 9 (2015) 64–84, https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/reep/reu022. 
[3] J.H. Ausubel, A. Grubler, N. Nakicenovic, Carbon dioxide emissions in a methane 
economy, Clim. Change. 12 (1988) 245–263, https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
BF00139432. 
[4] Z. Hausfather, Bounding the climate viability of natural gas as a bridge fuel to 
displace coal, Energy Policy. 86 (2015) 286–294, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
enpol.2015.07.012. 
[5] R.A. Alvarez, S.W. Pacala, J.J. Winebrake, W.L. Chameides, S.P. Hamburg, 
Greater focus needed on methane leakage from natural gas infrastructure, Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. 109 (2012) 6435–6440, https://doi.org/10.1073/ 
pnas.1202407109. 
[6] J.A. Delborne, D. Hasala, A. Wigner, A. Kinchy, Dueling metaphors, fueling 
futures: “Bridge fuel” visions of coal and natural gas in the United States, Energy 
Res. Soc. Sci. 61 (2020), 101350, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101350. 
[7] R.W. Howarth, A bridge to nowhere: methane emissions and the greenhouse gas 
footprint of natural gas, Energy Sci. 2 (2014) 47–60, https://doi.org/10.1002/ 
ese3.35. 
[8] R.W. Howarth, Is shale gas a major driver of recent increase in global atmospheric 
methane? Biogeosciences Discuss. (2019) 1–23, https://doi.org/10.5194/bg- 
2019-131. 
[9] R.A. Alvarez, D. Zavala-Araiza, D.R. Lyon, D.T. Allen, Z.R. Barkley, A.R. Brandt, 
K.J. Davis, S.C. Herndon, D.J. Jacob, A. Karion, E.A. Kort, B.K. Lamb, T. Lauvaux, 
J.D. Maasakkers, A.J. Marchese, M. Omara, S.W. Pacala, J. Peischl, A. 
L. Robinson, P.B. Shepson, C. Sweeney, A. Townsend-Small, S.C. Wofsy, S. 
P. Hamburg, Assessment of methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas supply 
chain, Science 361 (2018) 186–188, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aar7204. 
[10] L. Cremonese, A. Gusev, The uncertain climate cost of natural gas: assessment of 
methane leakage discrepancies in Europe, Russia and the US, and implications for 
sustainability, IASS Work. Pap. Dec. (2016), https://doi.org/10.2312/ 
iass.2016.039. 
[11] X. Zhang, N.P. Myhrvold, Z. Hausfather, K. Caldeira, Climate benefits of natural 
gas as a bridge fuel and potential delay of near-zero energy systems, Appl. Energy. 
167 (2016) 317–322, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.10.016. 
[12] Global Energy Monitor, Gas Bubble: Tracking Global LNG Infrastructure, 2020. 
https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GasBubble_ 
2020_r3.pdf. 
[13] GIIGNL, The LNG Industry: GIIGNL Annual Report 2019, International Group of 
Liquefied Natural Gas Importer, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2019. https://giignl. 
org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC_AREA/Publications/giignl_annual_report_2019- 
compressed.pdf. 
[14] Statista, Liquefied natural gas trade volume worldwide from 1970 to 2019 (in 
billion cubic meters)*, (2020). https://www.statista.com/statistics/264000/ 
global-lng-trade-volume-since-1970/. 
[15] J. Markard, The next phase of the energy transition and its implications for 
research and policy, Nat. Energy 3 (2018) 628–633, https://doi.org/10.1038/ 
s41560-018-0171-7. 
[16] A. Cherp, V. Vinichenko, J. Jewell, E. Brutschin, B. Sovacool, Integrating techno- 
economic, socio-technical and political perspectives on national energy 
transitions: a meta-theoretical framework, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 37 (2018) 
175–190, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.015. 
[17] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Premiere: Flüssigerdgas von Schiff zu Schiff getankt, 
Süddtsch. Ztg. (2019). https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/schifffahrt- 
brunsbuettel-premiere-fluessigerdgas-von-schiff-zu-schiff-getankt-dpa.urn- 
newsml-dpa-com-20090101-191004-99-159422 (accessed July 13, 2020). 
[18] K. Stratmann, Gasversorgung: LNG-Terminal in Sicht – Bewerber Brunsbüttel 
findet neuen Kunden, Handelsblatt. (2019). https://www.handelsblatt.com/ 
politik/deutschland/gasversorgung-lng-terminal-in-sicht-bewerber-brunsbuettel- 
findet-neuen-kunden/23973108.html (accessed July 13, 2020). 
[19] RWE Supply & Trading GmbH, RWE und German LNG Terminal vereinbaren 
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[21] Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, LNG-Terminal 
in Wilhelmshaven: Wie unterstützt Niedersachsen den “Neustart“?, 
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